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WHAT DO YOU MEAN I'M A LOBBYIST?:
NEW GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
RESTRICTIONS AND WHAT THEY WILL MEAN
FOR BANKING INSTITUTIONS
PAULA L. HOPPER & ROBERT G. HENSLEY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The market for government contracts is a rich one -
federal, state and local governments annually award contracts for
goods and services worth trillions of dollars to private companies
and individuals. Thus, it is not surprising that the recent epidemic
of corporate misbehavior,2 lobbying and political corruption
scandals,3 and controversial payments to, and actions by,
government contractors4 has sparked a recent wave of legislation
designed to combat the appearance of improper influence in
decisions regarding these often lucrative awards. At the same
time, both the general public and shareholders have begun
demanding greater transparency in key areas of interaction
between government and the private sector.'
Recent well-publicized cases suggest that regulators are
• Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP.
1. GovCB.com, http://www.govcb.com/service/aboutus.cfm (last visited Jan. 2,
2008).
2. Richard W. Stevenson & Jeff Gerth, Enron's Collapse: The System; Web of
Safeguards Failed as Enron Fell, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at Al; Press Release, Fed.
Election Comm'n, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") Pays
Largest Fine in FEC History (Apr. 18, 2006), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2006
/20060418mur.html.
3. Jim Drinkard, Lawmakers Move to Cut Lobbyists' Influence, USA TODAY,
Jan. 12, 2006, at 6A; Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, The Fast Rise & Steep Fall
of Jack Abramoff, How a Well-Connected Lobbyist Became the Center of a Far-
Reaching Corruption Scandal, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2005, at A01.
4. Michael Dobbs, Halliburton's Deals Greater Than Thought, WASH. POST,
Aug. 28, 2003, at A01; U.S. Security Official Quits; Iraq Says Shooting Victims
Offered Cash, CNN.coM, Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/l0/24/ir
aq.blackwater/index.html.
5. Bruce Lambert, Report on 'Pay to Play' Cites Contracts for Suozzi Donors,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at B8.
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now ready to take enforcement seriously. For example, the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) obtained significant
settlements from Freddie Mac and Weststar Energy, Inc. after
FEC investigations concluded that corporate resources were used
to facilitate contributions to the campaigns of candidates for
federal office in violation of the Federal Election Campaign
Reform Act (FECA).6 Both corporations endured months of
adverse publicity, and Freddie Mac paid the largest civil fine that
had ever been assessed by the FEC.
As frequent providers of financial products and services to
governments at all levels, these recent developments should be of
particular concern to banking institutions. This Article focuses on
recent legislative efforts across numerous jurisdictions, federal,
state and local, to restrict political and procurement activities by
businesses, including banks, doing or seeking to do business with
the government. These efforts have created a patchwork of
sometimes overlapping legal obligations that:
* Limit or bar political contributions and gifts;
* Require disclosure of contributions, communications,
or gifts;
* Apply the registration and reporting requirements of
lobbyists to officers and employees; and
* Treat political contributions of certain officers and
employees of a business as contributions by the
business.
Because the potential penalties for noncompliance are often
severe and, as discussed below, may trigger additional obligations
imposed under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this Article also outlines
practical internal corporate governance strategies that banking
institutions should consider to effect compliance with these new
legal obligations.
6. Jim Drinkard, Freddie Mac to Pay $3.8M to Settle FEC Allegations, USA
TODAY, Apr. 19, 2006, at 4A; Utility to Pay Fine in Campaign Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 2005, at A10.
7. For example, banks are commonly involved in transactions involving bonds
and municipal securities and with the administration of government pension and
retirement plans or payroll systems.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR RESTRICTIONS
In the past two years, a number of state and local
jurisdictions have enacted a variety of restrictions specifically
related to the political activities of businesses holding or pursuing
government contracts. In general, these restrictions are directed at
three areas of activity: (1) political contributions, (2)
communications, and (3) gifts. Restrictions on political contri-
butions have been aptly termed "Pay-to-Play" laws, and are
directed at countering the perception that campaign contributions
are an implicit quid pro quo that buy businesses a chance to "play"
the government contractor game. Under these laws, contributions
by contractors may be limited or banned completely. While on
their face such restrictions may appear straightforward,
compliance is often complicated by provisions that attribute
contributions by officers or employees of a business to the business
itself. Many jurisdictions have also begun to regulate comm-
unications between contractors and government actors by
amending the definition of "lobbying" to include attempts to
influence "administrative action," e.g., a decision regarding the
award of a government contract. As a result of these "vendor-as-
lobbyist" laws, individual government sales-team members, and in
some cases the banks that employ them, are required to register,
file detailed periodic activity reports, and comply with other
restrictions applicable to lobbyists. Finally, many jurisdictions
have enacted strict laws specific to contractors that limit or require
disclosure of gifts to public officials. Under these laws, even the
most mundane of gifts may be problematic."
These laws vary widely across jurisdictions, and it is beyond
the scope of this Article to survey the dozens of states and
municipalities that have so far enacted government contractor
restrictions. Thus, along with federal law, this Article will
principally discuss the legal approaches taken by New Jersey and
New York, two states with well-developed "Pay-to-Play" and
"vendor-as-lobbyist" laws.
8. See Philadelphia Bd. of Ethics Opinion No. 2004-03 (2004) (containing an
extensive discussion of the propriety of fruit baskets and flower arrangements).
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A. Pay-to-Play Laws
Procurement scandals in various jurisdictions have resulted
in a public perception that some government contractors make
campaign contributions to elected officials to improve their
chances of being awarded contracts or renewals. As noted above,
the purpose of "Pay-to-Play" laws is to eliminate or minimize
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety related to the
award of such contracts. While specific restrictions vary widely by
jurisdiction, in many instances Pay-to-Play legislation consists of
one or both of the following: (1) a "prohibition" law, which may
ban or restrict the amount a contractor or potential contractor may
contribute to an elected official, candidate, policymaker or
political party; and (2) a "disclosure" law, which supplements the
prohibition by requiring contractors to report their political
contributions to designated regulatory agencies. These pro-
hibitions and disclosures are often made more complicated by
"attribution" rules. Under such rules, contributions by a bank's
directors or officers and their family members, a bank's Political
Action Committee (PAC), or any parent or subsidiary business
entities may be attributed to the bank for purposes of the
limitations or disclosure.
An example of such legislation is New Jersey's Pay-to-Play
law (Chapter 19) enacted in 2004 as part of an effort to add
transparency to the process of awarding contracts.9 Chapter 19
limits political contributions by a business entity holding or
seeking a government contract valued in excess of $17,500, at any
one of four levels of New Jersey government: (1) the Executive
Branch or any department or agency of state government; (2) with
a state agency in the Legislative Branch, such as the Office of
Legislative Services; (3) with a county, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof; or (4) with a municipality, or any agency
or instrumentality thereof. Following the enactment of Chapter
19, Governor McGreevey signed Executive Order 134 (EO 134),
which imposed standards stricter than Chapter 19 on contracts
with the Executive Branch. The Executive Order was codified
9. Act of June 16, 2004, ch. 19, § 3 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
19:44A-20.4 (2007)).
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into law in 2005 as P.L. 2005 Ch. 51 (Chapter 51).' ° Both Chapters
19 and 51 comprise the "prohibition" part of New Jersey's Pay-to-
Play laws.
The "disclosure" section of New Jersey's Pay-to-Play law
was enacted in 2006 (Chapter 271).11 Chapter 271 requires
disclosure of contributions made by a contractor in two instances:
(1) to the government entity awarding a contract having value in
excess of $17,500, if the contract is not awarded pursuant to a fair
and open process; and (2) to the Election Law Enforcement
Commission (ELEC) in an annual report if a business entity has
received $50,000 or more in a calendar year as a result of any
contracts with New Jersey entities, whether sole source or
competitively bid.
As noted above, restrictions on Executive Branch contracts
differ from those applicable to contracts with the Legislative
Branch or counties, municipalities and their agencies. Specifically,
Chapter 51 disqualifies contractors from Executive Branch
contracts who have made contributions to the governor or a
candidate for governor within a specified period of contract
negotiations.12 ELEC has promulgated rules to implement New
Jersey's Pay-to-Play laws into two subchapters, one to deal with
the Executive Branch contracts and the other to address contracts
with state agencies in the Legislative Branch, counties and
municipalities. In each subchapter, the rules state that a "business
entity" is prohibited from making a contribution to certain
candidates or political parties during the term of a contract which
may have a relationship with that candidate's elected office or with
the political party of which that candidate is a member. While
both subchapters define "business entity" as any natural or legal
person, business, corporation (both for-profit and not-for-profit),
professional services corporation, limited liability company,
partnership, limited partnership, business trust, association, or any
other legal commercial entity organized under the laws of New
10. Act of Mar. 22, 2005, ch. 51 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
19:44A-20.13 to 20.25 (2007)).
11. See Act of Jan. 5, 2006, ch. 271, §§ 2-3 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19:144A-20.26 to 20.27 (2007)).
12. Act of Mar. 22, 2005, ch. 51, § 2 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
19:44A-20.14 (2007)).
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Jersey or any other state or foreign jurisdiction, the subchapter
pertaining to the Executive Branch also attributes the following
within this definition:
" All principals who own or control more than
10% of the profits or assets of a business entity
or 10% of the stock in the case of a business
entity that is a corporation for profit;
* Any subsidiaries directly or indirectly controlled
by the business entity; and
* Any political organization organized under
section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code that is
directly or indirectly controlled by the business
entity (i.e., a PAC), other than a candidate
committee or a political party committee."
Chapter 271 adds a comprehensive disclosure component
to New Jersey's Pay-to-Play laws. In particular, a "business entity"
now must disclose its contributions of over $300 to all political
party committees and PACs in New Jersey as well as specified
candidate committees. As with the "prohibition" rules, Chapter
271 has its own broad range of "affiliates" whose contributions
must be disclosed:
" Persons with a 10% or more "interest" in the
business.
" Any subsidiaries directly or indirectly controlled
by the business entity.
* IRS Code section 527 New Jersey based
organizations, directly or indirectly controlled by
the business entity (i.e., a PAC).
* All principals, partners, officers or directors of
the business entity and their spouses.
Noncompliance may result in both civil and criminal
penalties. For example, any person who purposely conceals or
13. Act of Mar. 22, 2005, ch. 51, § 5 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
19:44A-20.17 (2007)).
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misrepresents certain contributions is guilty of a crime of the
fourth degree. 4 A business entity found to have intentionally
made a contribution or failed to disclose a contribution in violation
of these laws may be liable for a penalty of up to the value of the
contract with the public entity, as well as be debarred from
contracting with any public entity for up to five years. 5 Penalties
for late filing of political contribution reports range from $6,000
for the first offense to up to $12,000 for each subsequent offense. 6
A contractor may also be debarred for engaging in the commission
of a criminal offense related to obtaining or attempting to obtain a
public contract. 7
Fortunately, New Jersey's Pay-to-Play laws provide
contractors with certain safe harbors, protecting them from
liability under the law, provided that the contractor acted in good
faith. For example, if a contractor makes an inadvertent
contribution to a member of the Executive Branch that would bar
a business entity from receiving a contract, the violation may be
cured if the contribution is fully reimbursed within thirty days
from the date the contribution was made.' For contributions
directed at any other governmental access point besides the
Executive Branch, a business entity has sixty days from the date a
contribution is made to make a written request for reimbursement,
and receipt must be had by the business entity within sixty days. 9
The failure to cure a mistake within the allotted time renders the
contribution a willful and intentional violation.
New Jersey has shown a particular willingness to enforce its
Pay-to-Play restrictions. In late 2007, New Jersey disqualified
twenty-four vendors for making improper contributions in
violation of the Pay-to-Play laws. The businesses involved ranged
from small-time electricians and landscapers to a politically
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-21 (2007).
15. Act of June 16, 2004, ch. 19, § 9 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
19:44A-20.10 (2007)).
16. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22(a)(1) (2007); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:25-17.3B
(2007).
17. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:4-1.2 (2007).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.20 (2007). However, a contribution made within
sixty days of a gubernatorial primary or general election is presumed to not be
inadvertent. Id.
19. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.9 (2007).
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connected law firm that represented members of the State
Legislature. The disqualifications resulted in a ban from
government work for up to eighteen months.
While the restrictions imposed under the law are
straightforward, compliance is complicated by the fact that banks
must track their contracting efforts across four different sub-
jurisdictions within the state: the Executive Branch, the Legislative
Branch, counties, and municipalities. Furthermore, banks must
consider attribution rules which may require disclosure of
contributions by officers, directors, and, in some cases, their family
members. Obtaining accurate information on a timely basis from
these individuals can often be a challenge. In jurisdictions where
officer or director contributions are also attributed toward
contribution limits, banks are faced with an additional challenge of
exercising effective internal governance over individual political
contributions while avoiding a "big brother is watching you"
atmosphere.
For banks with a presence within New Jersey, an additional
layer of complexity is created by the enactment of numerous
municipal ordinances that may differ from the state law. As of
January 2, 2008, twenty-one counties within New Jersey had
posted Pay-to-Play ordinances on the New Jersey Secretary of
State's website. °  It is likely that other municipalities or
government entities within these counties, such as boroughs,
townships, school boards, sewage authorities, and utility
authorities, will follow this trend and adopt their own Pay-to-Play
rules. Without a system to monitor this patchwork of evolving
regulation, a bank can quickly expose itself, its investors, and its
employees to significant liability.
B. Lobbying Disclosure; Vendors as Lobbyists
Every state has its own laws that regulate lobbyist
registration and reporting requirements for both individuals and
corporations attempting to influence official legislative action.
Recently, there have been notable changes to these laws as a result
20. Department of State, Pay-to-Play Ordinances, http://www.nj.gov/state/secre
tary/ordinance.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
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of local, state, and federal political scandals. In particular, many
municipalities are either in the process of adopting or have already
adopted separate ordinances regulating attempts to influence
action by local legislative bodies (such as county commissions, city
councils, and school boards) and their administrative agencies.
The definition of "lobbying" in many of these jurisdictions has
been broadened to include not only traditional legislative activity,
but also contracts or communications with other branches of
government. Therefore, in many states and municipalities,
"lobbying" may now include attempts to influence "executive" and
"administrative action." As a result, attempts to secure a
government contract may now be considered to be lobbying and
require registration of individual government sales-team members
and, in some cases, registration of the bank as well. This call for
public transparency can place onerous reporting requirements on a
bank, its employees, and agents.
An example of such burdensome reporting requirements
can be seen in the 2005 amendments to New York State's lobbying
and procurement laws (New York Laws).2' These provisions,
effective January 1, 2006, regulate lobbying efforts related to
procurement contracts valued in excess of $15,000 by businesses
that spend, or receive in compensation, more than $5,000 per year
related to any lobbying effort.22 With regard to such contracts, the
law defines "lobbying" as "any attempts to influence ...any
determination by a public official or a person or entity working in
cooperation with a public official, related to a governmental
procurement."23 "Public official" is broadly defined to encompass
all state and local government officials including state elected
officials, officers, and employees of state departments and
agencies, and municipal officers, and employees. 4
The New York Laws also require each individual or
business that engages in lobbying to file a Statement of
Registration on a biennial basis as well as bi-monthly reports
21. New York State Lobbying Act, Ch. 2 of the Laws of 1999, amended by Ch. 1
of the Laws of 2005 (codified as amended at N.Y. LEGIS. LAW ch. 32, art. 1-a
(McKinney 2007)).
22. Id. § 1-c(r).
23. Id. § 1-c(c)(v).
24. Id. § 1-c(1).
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documenting lobbing activities and expenditures with the New
York Ethics Commission (the Commission).2 Clients of lobbyists
(including the business entity) must also file semi-annual reports.
Penalties can be severe. A fine ranging from $10 to $25 per day
may be imposed by the Commission for late filing of any required
statement or report.26 Significant civil penalties, up to $25,000 for
each violation, may be imposed on "[a]ny lobbyist or client that
knowingly and willfully fails to file a statement or report within the
time required for filing such report.
' 27
Complying with these varying lobbyist procurement laws
provides a unique challenge for banks and their government sales
force, especially those banks with a regional and national presence.
Each state has its own laws and regulations that govern lobbying
activities, but it is no longer enough to focus on state law as
municipalities continue to enact their own lobbying ordinances to
regulate the activities of government sales persons. Thus, as with
Pay-to-Play laws, banks must also track municipal ordinances in
order to remain responsive to those that may impose additional
obligations on their government sales persons as well as the banks
themselves.
In order to ensure compliance with the multitude of
lobbying laws, banks should first gain a clear understanding of how
"lobbyist" and "lobbying activity" is defined in each jurisdiction in
which it has a presence. The bank has a responsibility to both its
employees and investors to know who is considered to be a
"lobbyist" and what regulatory requirements or restrictions are
placed upon such persons. Once an individual is designated a
lobbyist, a system must be established to ensure timely and
accurate filings of all required disclosure reports. The bank should
also provide training and written materials regarding any special
restrictions placed upon lobbyists within the relevant jurisdiction.
This may include limitations on contributions and gifts to
particular candidates as well as disclosure of these items to
25. Id. § 1-e(a).
26. Id. § 1-e(e).
27. New York State Lobbying Act, Ch. 2 of the Laws of 1999, amended by Ch. 1
of the Laws of 2005 (codified as amended at N.Y. LEGIS. LAW ch. 32, art. 1-o(b)(iv)
(McKinney 2007)).
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governmental authorities.
Penalties for noncompliance with these laws can be severe.
While monetary fines may be an obvious concern for banks, in
many jurisdictions failure to comply with lobbying laws may also
carry with it the potential loss of employment for the individual
government banker. Numerous laws and ordinances state that
lobbyists will be banned from any "lobbying activity" (including
attempts to procure government contracts) should the laws be
violated.
C. Gift Laws
In addition to clamping down on campaign finance and
lobbying activity, every level of government is also tightening its
gift rules. These gift rules can impact both those entities subject to
Pay-to-Play laws as well as vendors that are considered to be
lobbyists. Banks should ensure that neither their employees nor
agents are violating national, state or municipal government laws
concerning offerings or providing business (or in some cases,
personal) gifts and gratuities to government employees,
policymakers, or elected officials. Federal and state anti-bribery
laws and anti-gratuity laws make it a criminal act to give anything
of value to a government official with the intent to influence an
official act or in return for or because of an official act.28 As
discussed below, various levels of government impose specific
restrictions or disclosure requirements on government contractors
related to gifts based both on their status as contractors and by
virtue of vendor-as-lobbyist laws.
1. Federal Lobbyists - Gifts
On September 14, 2007, President Bush signed the Honest
28. Under federal law, bribery carries a penalty of up to fifteen years
imprisonment and a fine of up to three times the value of the bribe. 18 U.S.C.A. §
201(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). Anyone who otherwise gives or promises a public
official, and any public official who otherwise seeks or receives anything of value for
or because of an official act, is liable for the offense of illegal gratuity and faces
penalties of up to two years imprisonment and fines. 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(c) (West
2000 & Supp. 2007).
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Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (the Act).29 The
Act significantly impacts the ability of registered lobbyists and the
organizations that employ them to provide gifts to members of
Congress and their staff. Registered lobbyists and the organ-
izations that employ them may no longer provide meals, gifts, or
travel reimbursements except in very limited circumstances and in
accordance with House and Senate rules (which may differ). In
particular, the Act:
* Directly prohibits the giving of a gift by a
lobbyist or lobbyist employer that is not
permissible under the applicable congressional
gift rules.
* Changes the Senate gift rules to ban gifts to
Senators and Senate staff from lobbyists and
entities that employ or retain lobbyists except as
provided for in specific circumstances (e.g.,
constituent events).
* Requires a lobbyist employer and its lobbyists to
certify that they have not provided any travel or
gift to congressional members or staff that
violates the applicable congressional gift rules
holding liable both lobbyists and their
employers for violations.
* Changes relevant gift rules to ban members of
Congress from attending convention events in
their honor if paid for by lobbyists or entities
that employ or retain lobbyists.3 °
The penalties for knowing violations now include
criminal penalties. In addition, the Act quadruples the
maximum penalty for a violation to the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) from $50,000 to $200,000.31
29. Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (2007).
30. See id.
31. Id. § 211(a)(2).
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An individual who knowingly and corruptly fails to comply
32
with LDA may be imprisoned for up to five years.
2. Federal Contractors - Gifts
The federal government has long imposed stringent ethical
responsibilities on its government contractors. Congress and the
Executive Branch have significantly broadened the ethical
considerations governing federal contracts.33  Any bank that
currently has a contract with the federal government or is
considering such a contract must ensure that these ethics-related
statutes and regulations regulating gifts are adhered to or face
civil, administrative, or criminal sanctions. With very limited
exceptions, contractors are restricted by criminal statutes and
contracting regulations from providing goods and services for the
personal benefit of federal employees.
Almost every federal agency has published a standard of
conduct to advise its employees regarding ethical behavior during
procurement activities. These standards may differ by agency, and
it is imperative that contractors fully review the standards of
agency conduct prior to entering into a contract. Fortunately, all
of the differing standards of conduct have a common, overlapping
ethical theme based on guidelines published by the Office of
Government Ethics (OGE).34 The standards set forth by the OGE
prohibit federal employees from soliciting or accepting any
"gratuity." "Gratuity" is generally defined as "any gift, favor,
entertainment, loan, or anything of monetary value."35 In addition,
the Federal Acquisition Regulations state that, as a general rule,
no government employee may "solicit or accept, directly or
indirectly, any gratuity, gift, favor, entertainment, loan, or
anything of monetary value" from anyone who:
32. Id. § 211(a)(3).
33. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 7353 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
34. U.S. OFFICE OF GOV'T ETHICS, COMPILATION OF FEDERAL ETHICS LAWS,
http://www.usoge.gov/pages/laws-regs-fedreg-stats/compjed ethics-laws.pdf (last
visited Jan. 9, 2008).
35. 48 C.F.R. § 3.101-2 (2007).
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* Has or is seeking to obtain government business
with the employee's agency;
" Conducts activities that are regulated by the
employee's agency; or
* Has interests that may be substantially affected
by the performance or nonperformance of the
employee's official duties.36
While there is a de minimus value exception permitting
gifts of $20 or less per occasion, the aggregate value of gifts from
any single source cannot exceed $50 per year.37 This exception,
therefore, may create a trap for the unwary. If, for example, three
bank officers provided $20 gifts within a year, the law could be
violated although each individual gift was itself de minimus.
Effective communication and internal governance are necessary to
track these individual activities and ensure that aggregate limits
are not exceeded.
3. Gifts to State or Municipal Government Contractors or
Lobbyists
Government contractors with state and municipal agencies
are subject to additional restrictions, often more stringent than
their federal counterparts.38 Violations of these laws may also
result in criminal prosecution, civil penalties, termination of a
contract, and suspension or debarment for the contractor or
contributor. In New Jersey, for example, specific gift rules pertain
to both Pay-to-Play participants and vendors considered to be
lobbyists. Under New Jersey Pay-to-Play laws, a seller or supplier
who presently has a contract with the state or is seeking a contract
is barred from giving any fee, compensation, gift or gratuity of any
kind, to any person employed within the Department of Treasury
or to any other state employee who has duties or responsibilities in
connection with state purchasing.39
36. Id.
37. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(a) (2007).
38. The relevant gift law in North Carolina can be found at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
138A-32 (2007).
39. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-19 (2007).
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Pursuant to New Jersey's lobbying laws, lobbyists and
governmental affairs agents are prohibited from giving anything of
value to any state official or employee that exceeds $250 per
calendar year.4° Moreover, the lobbyist or agent's annual report
must disclose any benefit provided to a state official and the
official's immediate family when such benefit exceeds $25 per day
or $200 per calendar year.4' Any person found in violation of the
• 42
gift-giving prohibition is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Compliance with these gift laws requires banks to consider
both the law as it applies to government contractors and as it
applies to bank employees considered to be lobbyists. Individuals
who are impacted by these laws must be trained on what they can
and cannot do as they interact, many times on a daily basis, with
governmental officials. Failure to provide adequate training may
result not only in monetary penalties, but also negative publicity
and harm to the business's reputation.
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Implications
Given this patchwork of restrictions on government
contractors, liabilities for registration and reporting failures or
improper gifts or contributions can quickly accumulate. In many
cases, the cost of non-compliance can be measured not only in
potential civil or criminal fines, but also in loss of present contracts
and bans on future contracting. Especially for banks with a
national presence, such potential liabilities, when recognized, may
trigger reporting obligations under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX or the Act).43
SOX was signed into law on July 30, 2002.44 The legislation
was a response to a number of major corporate and accounting
scandals, including those impacting Enron, Tyco International, and
WorldCom. These scandals left many employees and investors
penniless, resulting in a massive decline of public trust in
40. § 52:13D-24.1(a).
41. § 52:13C-22.1.
42. § 52:34-19.
43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
44. Id.
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accounting and reporting practices. In addition to the enhanced
standards that SOX places upon all United States public
companies, the Act also covers issues such as corporate
governance and internal control assessment. 4 The goal of SOX is
to limit corporate misconduct by expanding accountability of
corporate gatekeepers such as lawyers, accountants, and financial
analysts. In particular, Section 307 of SOX mandates that
attorneys report evidence of a material violation of securities law
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the corporation
or any agent thereof, to the Chief Legal Counsel, Chief Executive
Officer, or another equivalent officer. If those officers do not
appropriately respond by, for instance, adopting necessary,
appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the
violation, SOX requires the attorney to report the evidence to
either the board of directors or the equivalent of an audit
committee of the board of directors.46 In other words, this "up the
ladder" reporting requires both inside and outside counsel to
report credible evidence that would cause a prudent lawyer to
believe a material violation has occurred.
For banks operating in jurisdictions with government
contractor restrictions, violations of these laws may also constitute
"material violations" subject to the reporting requirements of
SOX. Moreover, the associated fines, penalties, and potential loss
of contracts, both present and future, could independently trigger
SOX disclosure requirements related to contingent liabilities
where these possible costs pose a risk of substantial injury to the
financial interests of the bank or its investors.
III. OVERALL COMPLIANCE STRATEGY
An effective strategy for managing the risks associated with
political activity can be a corporate compliance program based on
the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the guidelines set
forth by the United States Department of Justice for use by
prosecutors in determining whether to bring criminal charges
against corporations for acts of employees, also known as the
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3-205.5 (2007).
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"Thompson Memo." 47  Such an approach has been recently
commended in relation to a proposed amendment to the Federal
Acquisition Regulations that would require federal contractors to
adopt a comprehensive internal compliance program, based on
these guidelines, to detect and prevent improper conduct in
connection with the award or performance of government
contracts and subcontracts.48 While there is no "one size fits all"
compliance program for banking institutions, an effective program
should incorporate the following seven elements:
1. Establish standards and procedures to prevent and
detect criminal conduct.
The first step is to assess the compliance risks, develop
basic elements of the compliance program and determine
mechanisms to effectively measure the success of the
program. Key to developing these standards and proce-
dures is identification of the legal requirements that govern
the business activities of the bank and focus on areas of risk
47. LARRY D. THOMPSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 1 (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm. When the United States Sentencing Commission
(Commission) promulgated the organizational guidelines, it attempted to alleviate
the harshest aspects of institutional vulnerability by incorporating into the sentencing
structure the preventive and deterrent aspects of systematic compliance programs.
See PAULA DESIO, U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL
GUIDELINES, http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf (last visited Jan. 17,
2008). The Commission did this by mitigating the potential fine range if an
organization can demonstrate that it had put in place an effective compliance
program. Id. This mitigating credit is contingent upon prompt reporting to the
authorities and the non-involvement of high level personnel in the actual offensive
conduct. Id.
48. Contractor Compliance Program and Integrity Reporting, 72 Fed. Reg.
64,019 (Nov. 14, 2007). The proposed rule would require any government contractor
with a contract or subcontract exceeding $5 million and with a performance period
exceeding 120 days to have a written code of ethics and business conduct within thirty
days after the contract award. Id. Within ninety days, the contractor must
implement an employee ethics training program and create an internal governance
structure to insure adherence to the law and the contractor's own policies. Id.
Responsibility for internal compliance must be assigned to a sufficiently high level of
the organization and adequate resources must be allocated to ensure the
effectiveness of the program and the internal control systems. Id. The program must
provide for discipline, not only where improper conduct has occurred, but also where
there has been a failure to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect improper
conduct. Id. In addition, the proposed rule would mandate that the contractor's
internal compliance system require full cooperation with any government agencies
responsible for audit, investigation, or corrective actions. Id.
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most likely to arise, such as failure to register government
bankers under relevant lobbying laws. Thereafter, the
bank should adopt a policy statement, including a Code of
Conduct, that states in unambiguous language that its
employees must comply with all relevant federal, state, and
municipal laws and regulations, and develop written
procedures that employees must follow when interacting
with policymakers, elected officials, and governmental
employees.
2. Provide appropriate oversight by high-level personnel.
A bank's board of directors should be given oversight
responsibility for the bank's compliance program. The
board should name a "compliance officer," a high-level
employee who is assigned responsibility for administration
of the program. Specified individuals should be delegated
day-to-day responsibility and given adequate resources to
administer the program, which should include periodic
reporting to the board or an appropriate audit committee
or subcommittee. The compliance officer should begin by
identifying all employees whose conduct or decision-
making could lead to a violation of the relevant laws.
Typically, these will be employees who have lobbying or
other government affairs responsibilities in the relevant
jurisdictions. If the corporation is a government contractor,
members of the corporation's sales force should also be
included.
3. Exclude high-risk individuals from government activity.
Individuals within the bank who have a history of conduct
that is inconsistent with the compliance program or who
have engaged in certain illegal activities in the past should
not be permitted to exercise control over areas of risk
within the bank.
4. Establish effective communication of standards and
procedures to all levels of employees.
Training of relevant personnel is essential. Executives
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must receive training on the legal requirements applicable
to their areas of responsibility and their subordinates must
understand their compliance responsibilities and that
compliance is a condition of employment. Employees
should receive this training periodically and should be
asked to certify that they have read and will abide by the
applicable policies. Training may be two-fold: general
training may be given to all employees upon employment
with the bank and more targeted training should be
conducted annually with those employees who are directly
impacted by these areas of risk, such as government sales
force, lobbyists, PAC, and grassroots managers.
5. Monitor and audit for compliance, and provide and
publicize a system for reporting potential or actual
wrongdoing without fear of reprisal.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of their compliance
program, many organizations retain outside counsel to
audit ongoing political compliance risk. Moreover, there
must be a "tone at the top" whereby management
encourages compliance and supports those who report
improper or illegal conduct. There must be a system in
place that includes mechanisms that allow for anonymity or
confidentiality, whereby the bank's employees and agents
may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual
criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.
6. Provide incentives and discipline to promote
compliance, including discipline of individuals responsible
for the failure to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect
an offense.
Lack of appropriate disciplinary action can destroy the
credibility and effectiveness of a compliance program.
Management and employees must understand in advance
the consequences of noncompliance and appreciate that the
same standards will be applied to offenders regardless of
their position within the bank.
2008]
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7. Respond appropriately to violations and take steps to
prevent similar conduct, including modifying the program.
The program itself should prescribe measures to be taken,
if an offense occurs, to review the policies and procedures
and to amend them if necessary to reduce the likelihood
that the offense will be repeated. An ongoing evaluation
process is critical to the success of any compliance program.
Outside attorneys are frequently called upon to evaluate
the offense and investigate the programmatic measures that
might have failed to prevent the commission or detection of
the offense. Employee surveys can also be a critical
measure of a compliance program's effectiveness.
While no program can ensure compliance, the critical
factors in evaluating any program are whether the program is
adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and
detecting violations by employees and whether management is
actually enforcing the program or is tacitly encouraging or
allowing employees to engage in misconduct to achieve business
objectives. Institutional commitment is generally the determining
factor in any program's effectiveness.49 Given increased attention
to political law violations, as well as the complexities of
compliance across numerous jurisdictions, such compliance
programs should be a priority for all banks that are politically
active or contract with the government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new government contractor restrictions are a dynamic
area of law posing particular challenges for banking institutions.
Even considering the complications created by attribution rules,
political contributions are just a small part of the compliance
picture. The expansion of the definition of "lobbying" to include
attempts to influence decisions regarding the award of government
49. See United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he
existence of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether
the employee acted to benefit the corporation."). However, the commission of
violations in the face of a compliance program may suggest that the corporate
management is not adequately enforcing its program. Id.
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contracts has created potentially onerous registration and
reporting obligations for banks as well as their officers and
employees. Just as banks and other business would never consider
going without policies, procedures and training designed to
prevent unlawful harassment or other illegal conduct by their
employees, a proactive political compliance program designed to
ensure compliance with these new restrictions has now become a
necessity.

